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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the determination of the sustainable level of debt-GDP ratio for the 
combined debt of central and state governments relative to GDP using (a) an analytical 
approach which was followed by the Twelfth Finance Commission (FC 12) and (b) an 
econometric model using threshold estimation. These methods provide results which are quite 
close to the target debt-GDP ratio of 60% determined by the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management (FRBM) review committee of 2018. In order to understand the evolution of 
government debt in India, we have divided the period from 1991-92 to 2018-19 into two sub-
groups (A) consisting of years where a primary deficit was incurred; and (B) years where a 
primary surplus was shown. In the case of India, all years are characterized by primary deficit. 
These years are further divided into three sub-categories based on the contribution to the debt-
GDP ratio made by (i) primary balance and (ii) excess of nominal growth rate over interest 
rate. The approach used here provides a modified view of the dynamics of debt as explained 
by the contribution of cumulated primary deficit and that of the excess of nominal growth over 
interest rate which was used in Rangarajan and Srivastava (2004). We have shown that this 
dynamics is well captured by an ARDL estimation which estimates the individual contribution 
of each of the contributing factor to debt accumulation namely primary deficit to GDP ratio, 
lagged debt-GDP ratio, nominal GDP growth rate and interest rate. We find that government 
debt in India is likely to exceed the sustainable debt-GDP threshold by a large margin in the 
post Covid years and even after normalcy is restored, it would take a long period for 
sustainability to be restored. It would also require that adequate policy measures are taken to 
ensure that growth rate exceeds the interest rate over long contiguous periods. 
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Government debt in India consisting of central and state government debt net of inter-
governmental lending has experienced a sharp upsurge in 2020-21 due to the impact of Covid-
19. However, even before this shock, government debt relative to GDP breached the 
sustainability threshold as specified by centre’s FRBM act as revised in 2018 and as specified 
by the FC 12 and the subsequent FCs. Empirical testing using a number of econometric 
methods also substantiate this position. In Union Government’s 2021-22 budget, the indicated 
central fiscal deficit and available information on states’ fiscal deficit for 2020-21 and 2021-
22 indicate that the general government debt in India would reach a level which is substantially 
higher than the estimated or prescribed sustainability threshold. This will call for a long period 
of adjustment so as to gradually bring down the general government debt-GDP ratio in India, 
requiring substantive fiscal discipline on the part of the central and state governments 
accompanied by robust growth performance.  
In this paper, we estimate the sustainability threshold of general government debt in India using 
a ‘Threshold Estimation’ regression. We also conduct sustainability tests by suggested methods 
in the literature such as the stationarity of annual change in debt-GDP ratio and the existence 
of cointegration between government revenues and expenditures relative to GDP. We also 
estimate a relationship determining primary deficit relative to GDP as a function of lagged 
debt-GDP ratio, nominal GDP growth rate and effective interest rate using an ‘Auto Regressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL)’ estimation procedure. This helps in substantiating the proposition of 
the non-sustainability of government finances in India as also in examining its future prospects. 
The sample period for this study is 1991-92 to 2018-19 for historical estimation. In India, the 
explicit fiscal deficit as published by the union and state budgets do not capture the off-budget 
borrowings by the central and state governments. However, these borrowings are captured in 
the debt data published as a part of the liabilities statement of the union and state budgets.  
Therefore, in order to arrive at the magnitude of true fiscal deficit, we make use of the combined 
debt as published in Indian Public Finance Statistics (IPFS - various issues), by the Department 
of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.  Combined fiscal deficit is 
derived as the annual change in the combined debt of central and state governments between 
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two successive years. Further, to derive the primary deficit, we deduct the actual combined 
interest payments as given by the IPFS from the derived fiscal deficit. 
2. Sustainability norms: FRBM and Finance Commissions 
The FRBM review committee setup by government of India in 2016 had examined the earlier 
versions of centre’s FRBM of 2003 as amended from time to time along with state level Fiscal 
Responsibility Legislations (FRLs) which were enacted from time to time. While these acts 
and FRLs had defined individual debt-GDP/ debt-GSDP targets, the FRBM review committee 
(2017) provided a consolidated target for general government debt at 60% of GDP. The 
responsibility for maintaining this target was with the central government. This committee also 
specified centre’s debt target at 40% of GDP and by implication, that of state governments 
considered together at 20%. Our focus in this paper is with respect to the overall general 
government debt target and not its division between central and state governments. Preceding 
the analysis of the FRBM review committee, the FC 12 had provided a consolidated general 
government debt-GDP target of 56% consistent with sustainability norms. Subsequent FCs5 
did not specify such consolidated targets consistent with sustainability although they may have 
specified targets to be achieved by the end of their recommendation period, which may be well 
above sustainable thresholds. Thus, the FC 13 had specified a debt level of 68% of GDP to be 
achieved by 2014-15.  
In this paper, we examine whether such a sustainability threshold still holds, and the 
considerations taken into account by the FC 12 and the FRBM review committee for arriving 
at this threshold.  
3. Examining sustainability: literature review 
Three econometric tests have been suggested in order to examine the sustainability of fiscal 
policy or sustainability of debt in a country. For example, one necessary condition for fiscal 
sustainability is when the first difference of government debt relative to GDP is stationary, that 
is, it is integrated of order zero (Hamilton, 1986). Similarly, sometimes co-integration between 
government expenditures and government revenues is tested. If these two series are co-
integrated, then government finances are supposed to be sustainable (Trehan and Walsh, 1998). 
Bohn (2007) suggested an alternative approach where the existence of a co-integrating 
relationship between lagged level of debt and primary surplus was tested.  
 
5 FC 13 and FC 14 
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In contrast, Canzoneri et. al. (2012) argued for estimating a relationship between primary 
surplus/deficit and lagged level of debt where if previous debt is able to drive a higher primary 
surplus in future years, it may be indicative of sustainability. 
The concept of ‘fiscal fatigue’ introduced by Ghosh et. al. (2013) happens when public debt 
achieves some threshold and departs from this threshold value when the primary balance does 
not adjust to debt.  In these contributions, it is important to test for the responsiveness of 
primary balance to lagged levels of debt relative to GDP. Most of this work has been 
undertaken with respect to advanced countries.  
4. Understanding Evolution of government debt to GDP ratio in India: 1990-91 to 
2018-19 
In examining the evolution of government debt in India relative to GDP, it is useful to 
distinguish between the impact of main driver of growth in debt, that is, primary deficit as 
neutralized by the relative impact of excess of growth over interest rate. In this context, a 
decomposition was suggested by Rangarajan and Srivastava (2003) where the relative 
contribution of primary deficit relative to GDP and excess of growth over interest rate was 
estimated using the following relationship. 𝑏𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡−1[(1 + 𝑖𝑡) (1 + 𝑔𝑡)⁄ ]                        (1) 
Where 𝑏𝑡 is the debt-GDP ratio in period t 𝑝𝑡 is the ratio of primary deficit to GDP in period t 𝑔𝑡 is the nominal GDP growth rate in period t 𝑖𝑡 is the effective nominal interest rate in period t 
Writing 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡−1, equation (1) can also be written as 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡−1[(𝑔𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡) (1 + 𝑔𝑡)⁄ ]                        (2) 
Summing equation (2) over all time periods, we get 
∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 = ∑ 𝑝𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 − ∑ 𝑏𝑡−1 ×  [(𝑔𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡)(1 + 𝑔𝑡)]
𝑇
𝑡=1                  (3)  
In their paper, the relative contribution of different factors was studied over continuous periods 
of time such as decade wise contribution. However, in order to arrive at a more intuitive 
understanding of the drivers of debt, it is possible to utilize the same relationship by making a 
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distinction between two sub-groups of years namely, (A) consisting of years where a primary 
deficit (𝑝𝑡 > 0) was incurred and (B) years where a primary surplus (𝑝𝑡 < 0) was shown. 
These may be further divided into three sub-categories each depending on the nature of 
contribution to change in debt-GDP ratio as arising from (i) difference between growth rate 
and interest rate and (ii) primary balance.  
Category A1: 
In category A1 years, which may be associated with large upsurges in the debt -GDP ratios, 
we have the condition that 𝑝𝑡 > 0 and 𝑔𝑡 < 𝑖𝑡. These would capture years where growth rates 
suddenly dip or contract due to slowdowns or recessions. In these years, debt accumulates 
both because of primary deficit and because of the 𝑔𝑡 falling below 𝑖𝑡, implying ∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 > 0 
Category A2: 
In this category of years, forces of primary deficit (𝑝𝑡 > 0) and excess of growth over interest 
rate (𝑔𝑡 > 𝑖𝑡) partially offset each other. Debt increases if the contribution of excess of 
growth over interest rate is less than the contribution of primary balance. In this case also ∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 > 0. 
Category A3: 
In this case, even though 𝑝𝑡 > 0 the contribution of the term (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡) exceeds the 
contribution of  𝑝𝑡. This leads to a contraction in the debt-GDP ratio rather than an increase. 
Thus, in this case ∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 < 0. 
Category B1: 
In category B1 years, which may be associated with upsurges in the debt -GDP ratios, we 
have the condition that 𝑝𝑡 < 0 and 𝑔𝑡 < 𝑖𝑡. Despite a negative contribution of primary 
surplus, the relatively larger positive contribution of (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡) leads to an increase in debt-
GDP ratio. Therefore, we have ∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 > 0 
Category B2: 
In this category of years, forces of primary surplus and excess of growth over interest rate 
partially offset each other. Debt falls since the negative contribution of primary surplus more 




In this case, both primary surplus and excess of growth over interest rate contributes to a fall 
in debt-GDP ratio. This leads to contraction in the debt-GDP ratio rather than an increase. 
Thus, the impact of the contribution of each factor to change in debt-GDP ratio and the 
categorization of years according to the scheme indicated above is summarized in table 1. 












Contribution of weighted 
excess of interest-rate over 
growth-rate 
∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑇𝑡=1       𝑝𝑡 ∑ 𝑏𝑡−1 ×  [(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡)(1 + 𝑔𝑡)]𝑇𝑡=1  
Primary deficit years 
A1  + + + 
A2  + + - 
A3  - + - 
Primary surplus years 
B1  + - + 
B2  - - + 
B2  - - - 
Source (basic data): Authors’s representation 
Using this framework, we have analysed the evolution of general government debt in India 
over the period 1991-92 to 2018-19. The resultant categorization of the years is summarized in 
Table 2. It may be noted that in India’s case, there are no years characterized by a primary 
surplus.   
Table 2: Evolution of general government debt in India 
Indicators 








points points points 
% contribution to ∑ 𝒛𝒕 
Primary 
deficit years 
0.148 1.047 -0.899 7.061 -6.061 29 0.51% 
A1 0.225 0.198 0.027 0.880 0.120 3 7.50% 
A2 0.200 0.458 -0.258 2.294 -1.294 11 1.82% 
A3 -0.276 0.391 -0.667 -1.415 2.415 15 -1.84% 
Primary 
Surplus years 




B1 -- -- -- -- -- 0 -- 
B2 -- -- -- -- -- 0 -- 
B3 -- -- -- -- -- 0 -- 
Total (all 
years) 
0.148 1.047 -0.899 7.061 -6.061 29 0.51% 
Memo Debt GDP ratio (year-end) 
1991-92 0.609 
2019-20 0.757 
Source (basic data): IPFS – various issues, RBI, Union Budget – various issues, MoSPI 
It is thus seen that from the viewpoint of accumulation of debt relative to GDP, a patch of three 
years namely 2000-01 to 2002-03 was the worst since in this short period, the debt-GDP ratio 
shot up by 22% points, that is, a per year increase of 7.3% points on average. This was the case 
when both components on the righthand side of the equation (3) contributed to debt 
accumulation. These were category A1 years. Category A2 years consisted of a total of 11 
years in which while primary deficit accounted for increase in debt, it was partially neutralized 
by the excess of growth over interest rate. The net increase in debt-GDP ratio in these 11 years 
was 20% points, that is an increase of 1.8% points per year on average. There were 15 years in 
this history of 29 years when the debt-GDP ratio fell. A continuous patch of category A3 years 
was from 2006-07 to 2014-15. Overall, the category A3 years considered together accounted 
for a fall in the debt-GDP ratio of 28% points. This implies an average reduction in the debt-
GDP ratio by a margin of 1.8% points per year. Noticeably, these years occurred after the 
enactment of centre’s FRBM act of 2003 and the enactment of the state level FRLs in the next 
few years. When the debt-GDP ratio crosses the sustainability threshold, if it is followed by 
persistent fall or reduction in primary deficit, it would be one indication of absence of fiscal 
fatigue (Ghosh et. al., 2013). If on the other hand, primary deficit increases even as debt-GDP 
ratio remains above the sustainability threshold, it may accentuate non-sustainability.  
5. Empirical tests and estimation of sustainability threshold 
5.1 Determining sustainability threshold using balance of investible resources and 
investment demand 
There can be two approaches to determining a sustainable level of debt-GDP ratio in a country. 





A1 years 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03 3 
A2 years 
1993-94, 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, 2015-16, 
2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20 
11 
A3 years 
1991-92, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 




economy and competitive claimants on the supply of investible resources in order to ascertain 
an appropriate level of borrowing that can be undertaken by the government which would not 
drive the interest rate up and thereby crowd out private investment. In such an approach, 
government borrowing should be in consonance with supply of investible resources and 
demand for it from non-government sectors that is, non-government public sector and private 
sector, so as to ensure that the economy keeps close to its potential growth rate. An analytical 
perspective of this kind was provided in India’s context by the FC 12 in their report published 
in 2004. In this analysis, a sustainable debt-GDP ratio was linked to a corresponding fiscal 
deficit-GDP ratio such that if the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio is maintained at the given level, it 
would ensure that the debt-GDP ratio remains stable. This combination of stable fiscal deficit-
GDP ratio and debt-GDP ratio was given by the following relationship. 𝑓∗ = 𝑏∗. 𝑔1 + 𝑔                             (4) 
Where 𝑓∗ is the debt stabilizing fiscal deficit-GDP ratio, 𝑏∗ is stabilized debt-GDP ratio and  
g is the nominal GDP growth  
In this equation, once 𝑓∗ that is, the debt-stabilizing level of fiscal deficit relative to GDP is 
determined, the corresponding level of 𝑏∗ at which debt is stabilized can also be determined. 
As indicated in equation (4), this relationship depends on the level of GDP growth. In order to 
determine 𝑓∗, considerations of supply and demand for investible resources are brought in. The 
Commission argued at that time that in India’s case, it is the household sector’s financial 
savings which provided the investible surplus in the system on which claims are made by three 
deficit sectors whose own savings fell short of their own investment demand namely, 
government, non-government public sector and the private sector. Estimated total investible 
resources consisted of household sector’s financial savings (10-11% of GDP), and sustainable 
net inflow of foreign capital (1.5-2% of GDP). On this, government demand based on their 
fiscal deficit of 6% of GDP would leave the balance of 6% of GDP to be shared between the 
non-government public sector and the private sector of say 2.5% and 3.5% of GDP 
respectively. If government fiscal deficit of 6% of GDP is combined with a nominal growth 
rate of 12%, it provides an estimate of the sustainable level of debt, i.e. 𝑏∗ at 56%. Since then, 
the household financial savings have come down and private investment demand of these 
investible resources has also come down. The FRBM Review Committee (2018) had 
marginally uplifted the FC 12 norm from 56% to 60% based on similar reasoning. The 
alternative to this approach is to utilize an econometric method for determining the 
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sustainability threshold. As discussed in the next section, the results of the econometric 
approach are not much different from the analytical approach discussed in this section. 
5.2 Econometric estimation of sustainability and sustainability threshold 
In this section, we carry out certain preliminary tests to ascertain sustainability of government 
finances in India. In the debt sustainability literature, a necessary condition for fiscal 
sustainability is when the first difference of government debt relative to GDP is stationary, that 
is, it is integrated of order zero. The empirical estimations in this paper have been carried out 
using E-Views 11 software. 
Table 3: Stationarity test (ADF test): results for 𝒛𝒕 
Test statistic t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -2.207 0.208 
Test critical values: 
1% level -3.689 
5% level -2.972 
10% level -2.625 
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values 
Source (basic data): Authors’ estimates  
Notes: ZT = change in government debt to GDP ratio 
  
Clearly, the first difference in the debt-GDP ratio in India’s case has a unit-root, that is it is not 
stationary. The related estimation results of the ADF test equation are given in Appendix Table 
1.  
Another test suggested in the literature is to examine whether the government revenue and 
expenditure series tend to move together in a manner such that the resultant of their relationship 
produces a stationary series (Hamilton, 1986 and RBI, 2020). This requires testing of the 
existence of cointegration between government revenues and expenditures. Here we have 
considered both series relative to GDP.  
Table 4: Cointegration Rank Test: results 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None 0.337 11.706 15.495 0.172 
At most 1 0.022 0.605 3.841 0.437 
Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
Source (basic data): Authors’ estimates 




These results indicate that there is no cointegration between the revenue and expenditure series 
relative to GDP at 5% level of significance. The results of the unrestricted cointegrated rank 
test are given in Appendix Table 2.  
Next, we consider the determination of primary deficit relative to GDP as a function of lagged 
debt-GDP ratio, real GDP growth rate and interest rate in an ARDL framework. With respect 
to lagged debt-GDP ratio, four lags are considered relevant. Two of these have a positive 
coefficient and two of these have a negative coefficient. The net effect is negative indicating 
that higher levels of previous debt relative to GDP lead to reduction in primary deficit relative 
to GDP.  The impact of nominal growth rate both contemporaneous and the lagged term is 
negative on primary deficit as expected. The interest rate has a strong positive impact. A 1%-
point increase in interest rate results in 4.05% points increase in the primary deficit relative to 
GDP. This equation can be used to project forward the future path of primary deficit by an 
iterative process. It requires future values of growth and interest rate variables.  
Table 5: ARDL model 
Dependent variable is PT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
PT(-1) 2.637 0.804 3.280 0.007 
PT(-2) -0.712 0.651 -1.094 0.297 
PT(-3) 3.338 0.480 6.957 0.000 
PT(-4) 0.431 0.198 2.183 0.052 
DT(-1) -1.957 0.752 -2.604 0.025 
DT(-2) 3.167 0.823 3.848 0.003 
DT(-3) -4.917 0.773 -6.359 0.000 
DT(-4) 3.620 0.433 8.359 0.000 
GT -0.243 0.060 -4.048 0.002 
GT(-1) -1.280 0.451 -2.841 0.016 
GT(-2) 0.734 0.345 2.125 0.057 
GT(-3) -2.693 0.319 -8.431 0.000 
IT 4.053 0.498 8.145 0.000 
C 0.043 0.123 0.353 0.731 
R-squared 0.969 Mean dependent var 0.037 
Adjusted R-squared 0.932 S.D. dependent var 0.017 
S.E. of regression 0.005 Akaike info criterion -7.658 
Sum squared resid 0.000 Schwarz criterion -6.975 
Log likelihood 109.722 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.468 
F-statistic 26.489 Durbin-Watson stat 1.647 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   
*Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model selection 
Source (basic data): Authors’ estimates  
Notes: PT = government primary deficit to GDP ratio, DT = government debt-GDP ratio, GT = real GDP 
growth, IT= effective interest rate. 
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Estimating sustainability threshold 
In this sub section, we estimate the sustainability threshold for government debt-GDP ratio 
using a discrete threshold regression6 where primary deficit relative to GDP is considered as a 
function of lagged debt-GDP ratio, and contemporaneous growth and interest rate variables. 
The sustainable level of debt-GDP ratio is estimated at 59.3% which is very close to the FRBM 
norm as also the norm specified by the FC 12. This is also close to the sustainability threshold 
of 61% estimated by Kaur and Mukherjee (2012) for India, although using a different 
methodology. We consider a single threshold dividing the sample period into two regimes as 
relevant. We consider that the behaviour of primary deficit relative to GDP may change if the 
debt-GDP ratio crosses a certain threshold. It may trigger suitable responses by policymakers 
to reduce primary deficit relative to GDP if the debt-GDP ratio is assessed to have crossed a 
certain prudent norm.  
Table 5 shows that up to the end of the sample period there is no indication that this threshold 
has changed. This is possibly because, in India the interest rate has not fallen significantly over 
time as was the experience of many advanced countries.   
Table 6: Threshold regression results 
Dependent Variable: primary deficit to GDP ratio (PT) 
Selection: Trimming 0.15, Sig. level 0.05 
Threshold variable: DT(-2) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
DT(-2) < 0.593 -- 5 obs 
C -0.589 0.127 -4.640 0.000 
DT(-1) 0.921 0.210 4.379 0.000 
0.593 <= DT(-2) -- 23 obs 
C -0.137 0.039 -3.567 0.002 
DT(-1) 0.149 0.029 5.232 0.000 
Non-Threshold Variables 
IT 1.144 0.274 4.183 0.000 
GT -0.203 0.061 -3.331 0.003 
R-squared 0.741 Mean dependent var 0.037 
Adjusted R-squared 0.682 S.D. dependent var 0.017 
S.E. of regression 0.010 Akaike info criterion -6.260 
Sum squared resid 0.002 Schwarz criterion -5.975 
Log likelihood 93.640 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.173 
F-statistic 12.585 Durbin-Watson stat 1.970 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   
Source (basic data): Authors’ estimates  
 
6 For a review of threshold models see Hansen (1999) and Tong. H, (2010, 2015) 
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The threshold value indicates that the impact of lagged debt-GDP ratio on primary deficit to 
GDP ratio at 0.149 is noticeably lower than that when the debt-GDP ratio is below the 
threshold. This marginal response coefficient is 0.921. In both cases, the sign is positive. 
In the context of the European countries for example, a recent paper by Ramos-Herrera and 
Prats (2020) has estimated 93.01% as the sustainability threshold for the debt-GDP ratio which 
is well above the Maastricht Treaty norm of 60%. In their case, both growth rate and interest 
rate have fallen over time. This empirical experience does not apply to India.  
6. Covid shock and post-Covid prospects 
Covid-19 has led to an upsurge in the government debt-GDP ratio of almost all countries across 
the world. It is likely that in the post-Covid period, large increases in the government debt-
GDP ratio of most countries would call for significant changes in their fiscal policy framework. 
In an earlier paper, Srivastava et. al. (2020) found that major economic crises have led to one-
time upsurges in the debt-GDP ratios of G-20 countries. These ratios tend to remain at high 
levels well after the crises are over, showing downward rigidity. It was estimated that Covid-
19 induced increase in government debt-GDP ratio for the G-20 countries, would amount to 
14.9% points on average which is more than 141% higher than the increase of 6.2% points 
resulting from the 2008 crisis. 
Srivastava et. al. (2020) developed a methodology to project government debt-GDP ratio as a 
function of incremental borrowing relative to GDP, real GDP growth and GDP deflator-based 
inflation. This methodology along with results for India are briefly discussed in this section.  
The change in the government debt-GDP ratio in a country can be decomposed into three 
factors namely, (1) increased borrowing, (2) real growth rate and (3) inflation rate. Change in 
government debt amounts to a country’s fiscal deficit which is one of the main instruments 
through which a stimulus is injected in order to overcome an economic crisis.  
Change in the government debt-GDP ratio in any year t may be defined as: 
𝒃𝒕 − 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 = 𝒇𝒕 − 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 [ 𝒈𝒕𝒏(𝟏 + 𝒈𝒕𝒏)]                  (𝟓)  
Here, 𝒃𝒕 and 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 denote the debt-GDP ratio in the year t and t-1 respectively. 𝒇𝒕 is the fiscal 
deficit to GDP ratio in year t which is defined as change in the level of debt relative to the 
level of nominal GDP, that is, 𝒇𝒕 = 𝑩𝒕−𝑩𝒕−𝟏𝒀𝒕  
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𝑔𝑡𝑛 refers to the nominal growth rate which can be expanded as the sum of real growth rate 
and the inflation rate, that is, 𝒈𝒕𝒏 = 𝒈𝒕 + 𝝅𝒕 + 𝒈𝒕𝝅𝒕   
Equations (5) can be written as follows after ignoring the interaction term (𝒈𝒕𝝅𝒕): 𝒃𝒕 = 𝒇𝒕 + 𝒃𝒕−𝟏. [𝟏 − 𝒈𝒕 − 𝝅𝒕 + 𝒈𝒕𝟐 + 𝝅𝒕𝟐 + 𝟐. 𝒈𝒕. 𝝅𝒕]                                                           (𝟔) 
Equation (6) was used to project the government debt-GDP levels for 2020 and 2021 using 
independent projections of fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, real GDP growth and inflation rate. 
Projected government debt-GDP ratio for India in 2020 (Fiscal year 2020-21) and 2021 (Fiscal 
year 2021-22) are given in Table 6. An increase of 16.6% points in India’s government debt-
GDP ratio is likely in 2020 over 2019, reflecting the adverse impact of the pandemic. 
Table 7: Projected government debt relative to GDP: 2020 and 2021 













IND 69.6 72.3 88.9 89.8 16.6 0.9 
Source: Srivastava, et al. (2020). 
This increase in government debt-GDP ratio has been decomposed into contributions from 
three factors namely, fiscal deficit, growth and inflation. Equation (6) can be re-written as 𝒃𝒕 = 𝒇𝒕 + 𝒃𝒕−𝟏. [𝟏 − (𝒈𝒕 − 𝒈𝒕𝟐) − (𝝅𝒕 − 𝝅𝒕𝟐)]                                                                         (𝟕) 
Equation (7) indicates that in order to derive the current level of debt-GDP ratio, only a 
proportion of previous year’s debt to GDP ratio should be added to the current fiscal deficit 
relative to GDP. This fraction applied to previous year’s debt to GDP ratio depends on current 
real growth and inflation levels. Higher the levels of current growth and inflation, the lower 
would be the increase in the current level of debt to GDP ratio.  
Equation (7) can be further modified and written as: 
𝟏 = 𝒇𝒕∆𝒃𝒕 + (−𝟏) ∗  𝒃𝒕−𝟏 ∗ [(𝒈𝒕 − 𝒈𝒕𝟐) + (𝝅𝒕 − 𝝅𝒕𝟐)]∆𝒃𝒕                                                             (𝟖) 
The contribution of the second term in equation (8) can be divided into two terms with 
associated signs as indicated below: (−𝟏)∗ [𝒃𝒕−𝟏.(−|𝒈𝒕|−|𝒈𝒕|𝟐)]∆𝒃𝒕  [that is  𝒃𝒕−𝟏.(𝒈𝒕+𝒈𝒕𝟐)∆𝒃𝒕  ] and  (−𝟏)∗ 𝒃𝒕−𝟏.(𝝅𝒕−𝝅𝒕𝟐)∆𝒃𝒕  
Thus, a negative growth rate will contribute positively to the increase in the debt-GDP ratio 
while a positive inflation will contribute negatively to the increase in debt-GDP ratio. If a 
country experiences a price deflation in a crisis year, even the third term would contribute 
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positively to the increase in the debt-GDP ratio. Table 7 shows the estimated contribution to 
increase in government debt-GDP ratio for India with respect to the two crisis years namely, 
2009 and 2020.  
Table 8: contributions to change in debt-GDP ratio 
Period 





Growth Inflation Residual Total 
2009 over 2008 7.9 -5.6 -4.1 0.3 -1.7 8.5 
2020 over 2019 12.1 8.2 -3.1 -0.7 16.6 -10.3 
Source: Srivastava, et al. (2020). 
With respect to the 2008 crisis, India could show a contraction in its debt-GDP ratio of (-)1.7% 
points as the contribution of the growth factor to the increase in government debt-GDP ratio 
was negative. The dynamics reversed in the 2020 crisis with real GDP growth contracting 
sharply. Consequently, there was a positive contribution of the growth factor to the increment 
in government debt-GDP ratio. Further, the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio also increased sharply due 
to large stimulus package announced by the government. 
7. Concluding observations 
In the pre-Covid era, the sustainable level of government debt in India, comprising both central 
and state government debt, was specified at 56% of GDP by the FC 12 using an analytical 
approach which involved balancing available investible resources consisting of household 
sector’s financial savings and net capital inflows from abroad against demand for these 
resources from the three deficit sectors namely, government, non-government public sector and 
the private sector. Using a similar approach, the FRBM Review Committee (2017) uplifted this 
sustainability threshold to 60% of GDP. Empirical tests indicate that the debt-GDP ratio in 
India in the pre-Covid years had already exceeded this threshold by a large margin. Srivastava, 
et al. (2020) estimated the combined government debt-GDP ratio at 72.3% at the end of 2019-
20. With significantly high fiscal deficit in 2020-21 for providing fiscal stimulus, the estimated 
debt-GDP ratio at the end of 2020-21 and 2021-22 would be close to 90%.  Since there is no 
significant increase in investible resources in the near future, high levels of primary deficit may 
soon have to be reversed in order to guide the economy back towards sustainable debt levels. 
The impact of lagged debt relative to GDP on primary deficit relative to GDP in the debt 
dynamics relationship indicates that high levels of previous debt would reduce future primary 
deficits thereby leading to reduction in the debt-GDP ratio. Given the large departure of actual 
debt-GDP ratio from its sustainable threshold, it may however take a considerable time before 
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sustainability is restored. If we go by the average per year reduction of 1.8% points of the 
category A3 years in the sample period, where growth rate exceeds the interest rate, it would 
take about 17 years for India’s debt-GDP ratio to reach back to sustainable levels provided any 
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Appendix Table 1: ADF Test: results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
ZT(-1) -0.323 0.146 -2.207 0.036 
C 0.003 0.005 0.605 0.551 
R-squared 0.158 Mean dependent var 0.002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 S.D. dependent var 0.027 
S.E. of regression 0.025 Akaike info criterion -4.469 
Sum squared resid 0.016 Schwarz criterion -4.374 
Log likelihood 64.563 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.440 
F-statistic 4.869 Durbin-Watson stat 2.000 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.036   
Source: Authors’ estimates 




Appendix table 2: Cointegration Rank Test Results 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
None 0.337 11.101 14.265 0.149 
At most 1 0.022 0.605 3.841 0.437 









None 0.337 11.101 14.265 0.149 
At most 1 0.022 0.605 3.841 0.437 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 




Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha): 
D(RT) 0.003 -0.001 
D(ET) -0.004 -0.001 
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood 191.127 












Source: Authors’ estimates 








































(𝒓𝒕) Expenditures-GDP ratio (𝒆𝒕) 
1990-91 0.609 -- -- 0.168 0.055 -- 0.172 0.266 
1991-92 0.597 -0.011 0.021 0.150 0.011 0.088 0.184 0.260 
1992-93 0.593 -0.004 0.026 0.149 0.055 0.091 0.178 0.258 
1993-94 0.612 0.019 0.048 0.151 0.048 0.094 0.168 0.255 
1994-95 0.590 -0.022 0.018 0.173 0.067 0.097 0.173 0.248 
1995-96 0.570 -0.020 0.018 0.173 0.076 0.097 0.172 0.239 
1996-97 0.552 -0.018 0.010 0.157 0.075 0.102 0.168 0.230 
1997-98 0.574 0.022 0.025 0.108 0.040 0.102 0.167 0.239 
1998-99 0.581 0.007 0.029 0.147 0.062 0.104 0.155 0.251 
1999-00 0.616 0.035 0.043 0.122 0.088 0.107 0.165 0.259 
2000-01 0.712 0.096 0.082 0.076 0.038 0.100 0.164 0.255 
2001-02 0.781 0.069 0.062 0.082 0.048 0.092 0.164 0.262 
2002-03 0.841 0.060 0.054 0.077 0.038 0.085 0.170 0.264 
2003-04 0.876 0.035 0.062 0.120 0.079 0.084 0.178 0.268 
2004-05 0.894 0.018 0.066 0.141 0.079 0.079 0.184 0.259 
2005-06 0.895 0.001 0.054 0.140 0.079 0.072 0.192 0.258 
2006-07 0.854 -0.041 0.035 0.171 0.081 0.072 0.205 0.257 
2007-08 0.821 -0.033 0.028 0.151 0.077 0.069 0.206 0.254 
2008-09 0.813 -0.007 0.034 0.126 0.031 0.069 0.191 0.274 
2009-10 0.791 -0.023 0.037 0.155 0.079 0.071 0.185 0.285 
2010-11 0.737 -0.054 0.031 0.199 0.085 0.070 0.203 0.276 
2011-12 0.729 -0.008 0.039 0.144 0.052 0.072 0.189 0.270 
2012-13 0.718 -0.011 0.031 0.138 0.055 0.072 0.194 0.266 
2013-14 0.712 -0.006 0.029 0.130 0.064 0.075 0.193 0.263 
2014-15 0.706 -0.006 0.018 0.110 0.074 0.073 0.185 0.255 
2015-16 0.721 0.015 0.035 0.105 0.080 0.074 0.198 0.274 
2016-17 0.709 -0.012 0.017 0.118 0.083 0.073 0.199 0.267 
2017-18 0.724 0.015 0.037 0.110 0.068 0.075 0.198 0.260 
2018-19 0.725 0.002 0.023 0.105 0.065 0.072 0.196 0.262 
2019-20 0.757 0.032 0.037 0.078 0.040 0.070 -- -- 
Source (basic data): IPFS statistics – various issues, Union Budget documents - various issues and MoSPI,  
 
 
